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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A.
MADSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 14530

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
THE OPINION FAILED TO CONSIDER, ANp IS CONTRARY TO,
ALL FINAL CASES IN POINT
This case involves whether a mortgagee must account
for use of tax reserves paid by the mortgagor.

It is a case

of first impression in Utah and is enormously important.

It

is filed as a class action, could affect more than 20,000
mortgagors of defendant, and could involve millions of
dollars.

It will affect every mortgage lender in the state

and may create scores of class actions in the courts of the
state involving many, many millions of dollars.

It will

affect the availability of Utah lenders1 residential mortgage funds by affecting their ability to sell mortgages on
the national market.

The significance of the case may have

been obscured to the Court because the Earned plaintiffs'
case involved only $13.70 per year.

- 2 The case deserves careful reconsideration by the
Court of the prior case law in point.

The Court's three-to-

two opinion of January 14, 1977 totally ignored the body of
law consisting of 19 cases dealing with mortgage tax reserves
cited on page 23 of Respondent's Brief and page 5 of Appellants' Reply Brief.

Even Appellants' Brief admitted, pages

22-3, that Brooks v. Valley Bank, 539 P.2d 958, superceded
548 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. 1976), and Zelickman v. Bell Federal
Savings, 301 N.E.2d 47 (111. 1973), are in point and are
contrary to appellants' position and now the majority opinion.

Yet the opinion does not even mention that body of

law.
There is no difference between the "trust" theory
summarily rejected in those cases and the "pledge" theory
here.

The claimed duty to account for use of the res is the

same for a trustee as for a pledgee.

T)ie idea that the

parties intended that the mortgagee must account as a trustee
was summarily rejected in that body of law even though the
trust deeds said "the funds are paid in trust."
trust deed here said "pledge" no more m£ans,

That the

perforce, that

the parties intended the mortgagee must account as a pledgee
than it did in all the "trust" cases.
The question here is: Did thfe parties intend that
the mortgagee pay the mortgagor for use of tax reserves.
The majority opinion's premises are:

(1) the fungible money

- 3was a pledge because the trust deed used the word "pledge"
and all elements of a pledge were preseiit (also present were
the words and elements of a debtor/creditor, or trust, or
mortgagee relationship); and (2) all true pledgees must at
law account for the use of the pledge.

Therefore, the

opinion deduces the parties may have intended the mortgagee
must account for the use of the reserve funds.

The fallacy

of that deductive reasoning flowing froin the mere presence
of "pledge" elements in the trust deed Was shown in Sears
v. Federal Savings & Loan Association, 275 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.App.
1971), quoted at page 29 of Respondent's Brief.
Not a single case was cited in the opinion nor by
appellant for the proposition that any pledgee of money must
account for the use of the money, and m^re specifically, not
a single case cited in the majority opinion deals with
mortgage reserves.

Yet, by merely combining those two

independent premises, by citing general authority about
pledges that begs the issue, and by ignoring all final cases
in point, the majority opinion deduced a result contrary to
the uncontradicted facts of the admitted expressed intent of
both parties to the contract, contrary to their admitted 11year practice, contrary to the admitted long established
custom in the industry, and contrary to all final cases
dealing with mortgage reserves.

- 4 We pray that the Court grant Respondent1s Petition
for Rehearing, and that upon such rehearing, the Court
consider in its opinion the overwhelming contrary cases from
other jurisdictions, all dealing with mortgage reserves,
cited in Point III of Respondent's Brief and Point VII of
Appellants' Brief.

Having done so, we pray the Court vacate

its opinion of January 14, 1977, and that the Judgment of
the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DATE:

February 3, 1977

MOYLE & DRAPER

Byy)^.^/^^^
Joseph J. Palmer
Attorney for Respondent
600 t>eseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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FILED
NOV 5 "1976
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah

- 43a Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Sup.Ct. of Ariz.,
April, 1976), 548 P.2d 1166 ("Brooks II"L supersedes the
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Valley
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (1975) ("Brocks I"), cited at
page 31 of respondent's brief.

Brooks II sustained the

Superior Court's granting of motion to dfLsmiss the action,
as did Brooks I, holding:

(a) a trust w^s not created for

the impounded funds even though the word£ "in trust" were
used in the mortgage documents, and (b) the bank was not
unjustly enriched through use of the funds.

The reasoning

follows the opinion in Brooks I cited in respondent's brief.
The concurring opinion in Brooks II reasloned that a trust
was created because the bank received thle funds to be applied
to a particular purpose but, nevertheless, the dismissal of
the complaint was still proper, saying:
Brooks relies on the general i^ule of law
that it is the duty of a trustee to protect the interests of the beneficiary of
a trust by the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence in the management of
the trust property, Bulla v. valley National Bank of Phoenix, 82 Ariz. 84, 308
P.2d 932 (1957), and the general rule that
that trustee has a duty to invest the
trust property so that it is made productive for the beneficiary. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, §181 (1959). Where,
however, a rule of law might otherwise
be applicable to an agreements custom or
usage may make such rule of law inapplicable. Williston, Law of Contracts,
§648 (3rd ed. 1961).

- 43b The practice of requiring impound
payments has existed since the early
1930's, In every instance, without exception, where a suit has been brought
to compel payment of interest or the
earnings on the investment of the impound
funds, the lending institution) has not
paid the mortgagor for the use| of the impound funds. Nor is there anywhere the
slightest suggestion that the Valley National Bank or any lending institution
ever paid for the use of impound funds.
While a few isolated instances will
not prove a usage, one so firmly established for so many years nationwide should
be controlling. A usage will
it is uniform, long established, and so
well known that it can be said that the
parties contracted with reference to it
and the failure to conform to it would be
the exception. Cleveland etc. R.R. Co. v.
Jenkins, 174 111 398, 51 N.E. 811, Nor
is a usage invalid because it^ effect is
different from a general rule of law.
It is well settled i^hat a trade
usage which is contrary tjo a statute
or which contravenes public policy is
invalid and may not be iijvoked; but
where a rule of law is of a character
that the parties may make it inapplicable to their contract by express
agreement, they may likewise render
it inapplicable by implied usage or
by usage." Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83
F.2d 425, 431 (10th Cir. 1936).
I am therefore of the opinion that by
banking usage neither interest): nor earnings
on investment was expected to be credited
to the mortgagor.
A not-yet-reported decision i$ Throp v. Bell
Federal Savings & Loan A s s o c , Ill.App.CPt. , Docket No.
60252, decided July 26, 1976, aff'd on iehearing, 10-7-76.

- 43c It affirmed granting of defendant's motion to dismiss of
plaintiff's claim for earnings on the escrow funds, saying
"the use or non-use of the words 'in tri^st' is not the
controlling criteria as to whether an express trust has or
has not been created."

It is the most xfecent decision on

the subject and contains a review of recent authorities
similar to other cases cited in respondent's brief.

Its

reasoning is applicable to appellants' Simplistic argument
as to use of the word "pledge" in the mortgage document.
Finally, we cite the Report oij Committee on Real
Estate Financing entitled "Class Action^ Under Antitrust
Laws on Account of Escrow and Similar Practices," Real
Property Probate and Trust Journal of tl^e American Bar
Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
Volume 11, No. 2, Summer, 1976.

It concludes:

If lenders begin to pay interest on
escrow accounts, realistically the additional expenses that result will in some
manner be borne by borrowers either by
a carrying charge or increase in the loan
rates which would cover these expenses.
In short the payment of interest on escrow
accounts would not result in any economic
benefit to borrowers and would in all probability increase costs at leasij: on smaller
loans.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICfi
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of November,
1976, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief of Newly Uncovered Cases were delivered to Robert J. DeBry,
attorney for plaintiffs, 2040 East 4800 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
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POINT I
PRUDENTIAL'S ARGUMENTS ON PUBLIC POLjECY
ARE ILL FOUNDED
Prudential has devoted the major portion of its brief to
public policy arguments. Madsen has two general responses to such
arguments:
First, public policy arguments should play no role in a
summary judgment proceeding.

The reason is simple. Summary judgment

is appropriate where there is no material fact in issue and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The public policy considerations raised by Prudential depend on "material facts in issue.11
If this case is to be influenced by fact-related policy considerations,
the matter should be remanded for further factual development by a
trial.

As the record now stands, all of Prudential's policy arguments

are merely unsupported self-serving speculation.
Prudential's public policy argument$ basically boil down to
scare tactics. Prudential argues at length about all of the dire
results that will follow if it loses. The argument apparently goes
like this:
1. The home mortgage business is important to society.
2.

The home mortgage business is complicated.

3. The home mortgage business now works well.
4.

The courts should not tamper w^th an important economic
system which seems to be working well.

5. Madsen1s potential recovery is minimal.
6.

The courts should not break up [an important economic

institution simply to provide some minimal relief to
Madsen.
That is a very appealing argument.

The trouble is that all

of the premises are false. For example, Prudential argues that, "the
claim of Madsen, if successful, would adversely affect the marketability of mortgages in the secondary market."
p. 7.

Brief of Respondent,

However, there is simply no basis in this record to conclude

that this or any one of Prudential's other scare stories would come
true if Madsen wins this case.
This has been conclusively demonstrated by the recent action
of the Bank of America (see Brief of Appellant, p.18-19).
America is the largest banking institution in the world.

The Bank of
It has

voluntarily started a program to pay a regular passbook savings rate
of interest on mortgage escrow accounts. Not one of Prudential's
scare stories has come true to haunt Bank of America.
Madsen is tempted to respond in kind by theorizing for several
pages on the beneficial economic results of requiring Prudential to pay
interest on the impound funds. However, it is difficult to see how such
speculation by either Madsen or Prudential is material to this lawsuit.

POINT II
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Prudential's brief is laced with arguments about what the
parties intended.

Apparently, Prudential's position is that the parties

did not intend that interest be paid on the impound funds, and that the
contract should be construed to follow the intent of the parties.

-2-

The problem is that in a contract ckse intent is a jury
issue.

In other words, if the contract is on its face unambiguous,

the court can grant summary judgment as a mat|ter of law. However, if
the contract is ambiguous, the court may look] to the intent of the
parties as an aid in construction.

However, intent is a fact issue

and cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, 366 F.Si^pp. 464 (1973 DC Del.),
Ball v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 58 FRD.^62 (1973 DC Ky.).

POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
IS INAPPLICABLE
Prudential's argument on practical construction is but
another way for the court to determine the ibtent of the parties.
Madsen has already responded to the "intent" argument in Point II
above.

However, something further needs to be said about the doctrine

of practical construction.
Prudential's argument is basically that no one has ever
complained about Prudential keeping the profits on the impound funds
—

therefore the parties must have intended that Prudential could keep

the profits.
There is, however, one fatal flaw in the argument.

It is

true that at the time the contract was signed Madsen did not demand
or expect profits on the impound funds. Hoyever, there is nothing in
this record to show that Madsen was ever aware that Prudential was
investing the funds and earning a profit onl such investments.
Certainly Prudential made no such disclosure.

-3-

This lawsuit arises because Prudential, without the knowledge
or consent of Madsen, invested the impound funds and earned a profit.
Madsen seeks a share of that profit. The doctrine of practical
construction cannot apply here because Madsen did not know that
Prudential had invested his money and earned a profit thereon. Madsen
could not ask for his share of the earnings since he did not know that
such earnings existed.

POINT IV
PRUDENTIAL HAS AVOIDED THE CENTRAL ISSUE
OF A COMMON LAW PLEDGE
Madsen1s major thesis is that Prudential holds the impound
funds as a common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is liable
to the pledgor for any profit or increase in the pledged property.
Prudential attempts to dispose of this important issue in
one short paragraph by arguing that "a pledge is the passing of a
chattel."

Brief of Respondent, p.30-31.
However, at common law money was considered a chattel and

could be pledged.

In 2 Blackstonefs Commentaries 385, it is said:

"That things personal, by our law, not only includes
things moveable, but also something more; the whole of
which is comprehended under the general name of
chattels, which, Sir Edward Coke says, is a French
word signifying goods. fIn the grand coustumier of
Normandy, (he observes) a chattel is described as a
mere moveable, but at the same time is set in opposition to a fief or feud so that not only goods, but
whatever was not a feud, were accounted chattels; and
it is in this latter, more extended negative sense,
that our law adopts it f . . . ."
From Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th Ed.) we learn that
fief and feud were freehold estates in land.

-4-

Thus, anything which is

not a freehold estate in land is a chattel.
This definition of chattel was adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States in In re Gay's Gold, 80 tj.S. (13 Wall.) 358 (1871)
There it was said, "the word chattel, in its ordinary signification,
includes every species of property which is nc}t real or freehold. . . .
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 362.
As to money specifically, State v.flartlett,55 Me.200 (1867)
held that money is a chattel. That case was a prosecution for larceny
"of the goods and chattels" of several people. The defendant asserted
that money was neither a good nor a chattel; tjherefore, the indictment
was defective. The Maine Supreme Court, quoting from Holthouse's Law
Dictionary, held:

"Chattels personal are generally such as are

moveable and may be carried about the person of the owner wherever he
pleases to go; such as money . . . ." 55 Me. 210.
Similarly, in Gockstetter v. Williaitjs, 9 F.2d 928 (D. Mont.
1925), which involved the insolvency of a ban]^, the court held that
personal property includes money, and all things of a personal nature
are under the heading chattel.
Therefore, it is apparent that money was considered a
chattel at common law.

It does not seem to have ever been questioned

that money could be pledged, the same as any other chattel.

POINT V.
CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY PRUDENTIAL
IS NOT IN POINT
Prudential cites seventeen cases in support of its position.
Brief of Respondent, p.22-23. However, not one of those cases is in

point.

To begin with, all of those cases construe contracts

different from the contract before this court.
However, more importantly, not one of those cases speaks to
the pledge theory urged by Madsen.
on a trust theory.

Indeed, most of those cases turn

Madsen has not urged any trust theory in this

court.
In short, Prudential has cited seventeen cases which hold
that banks do not hold impound funds in trust. Madsen agrees.
However, Prudential has cited no cases which are in opposition to
Madsen1s pledge theory.

At common law, the pledgor was required to

account to the pledgee for any increase or profit on the property
pledged. (See Brief of Appellant, p.5-9.)
Prudential relies most heavily upon Zelickman v. Bell
Federal Savings, 301 N.E.2d (111. 1973), and Sears v. Federal Savings
& Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971).

It is true that the

agreements in both of these cases included the word "pledge11. However,
neither of those cases analyzed the legal result of a common law
pledge.

Indeed, both Zelickman and Sears assume that the impound fund

was a pledge. The issue in those cases was whether a trust was created
by the "pledge".
"We must expressly reject plaintiff's argument that
a trust is created because of use of the word 'pledge1
in the note. . . .. This contention is a complete
oversimplification and is based upon the most elementary
deductive reasoning. The syllogism is: Every pledge is
a trust. This note contains a pledge. Therefore this
note is a trust. However, the major premise is completely
invalid. Every pledge is not a trust. Sears v. Federal
Savings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971)."

-6-

It should also be remembered that Madsen's appeal deals
with a new and unsettled area of the law. Prudential has correctly
pointed to a number of cases dealing with related issues or different
fact situations. However, in such a new and Unsettled area of the
law, this court should look with caution upon the precedential value
of a handful of cases from foreign jurisdictions.

POINT VI
THIS IS A JUDICIAL AND NQT A
LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM
Prudential has made the argument thg.t this dispute ought
to be left to the legislature. Prudential cites no authority for
that novel argument. Perhaps Prudential believes that the issues are
too difficult or too important for this court to adjudicate.
Madsen has presented a contract issye to this court. From
time immemorial, courts have construed contracts. This contract case
is clearly a matter for judicial adjudication.

Ross v. Oregon, 227

U.S. 150, 57 L.Ed. 458, 33 S.Ct. 220.

CONCLUSION
The payment by Madsen of impound funds to Prudential is a
common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is entitled to any
increase or profit arising out of the pledged property.

Prudential

chose the word "pledge". Prudential accepted the pledge. Then,
without the knowledge or consent of Madsen, Prudential invested the
pledge and earned a profit. On principles of law and justice as old
as civilization, Madsen is entitled to the increase in the value of
his pledge.

-7
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